Virtuous Billing by Gordon, Randy D. & Rapoport, Nancy B.
 698 
VIRTUOUS BILLING 
Randy D. Gordon* & Nancy B. Rapoport** 
Aristotle tells us, in his Nicomachean Ethics, that we become ethical 
by building good habits and we become unethical by building bad hab-
its: “excellence of character results from habit, whence it has acquired 
its name (êthikê) by a slight modification of the word ethos (habit).” Ex-
cellence of character comes from following the right habits. 
Thinking of ethics as habit-forming may sound unusual to the mod-
ern mind, but not to Aristotle or the medieval thinkers who grew up in 
his long shadow. “Habit” in Greek is “ethos,” from which we get our 
modern word, “ethical.” In Latin, habits are moralis, which gives us the 
word, “moral.” Aristotle explains that we cannot alter nature by prac-
tice: we cannot teach or train a rock to roll up a hill no matter how often 
we throw it up. But we can alter ourselves by practice. We can train 
ourselves to be ethical by practice, just as we learn to play the harp by 
practice.1 
It is a timeless adage that when analyzing the unacceptable behav-
ior of others, one should never attribute to malice that which can be ad-
equately explained by stupidity.2 
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1  Ronald D. Rotunda, Why Lawyers Are Different and Why We Are the Same: Creating 
Structural Incentives in Large Law Firms to Promote Ethical Behavior—In-House Ethics 
Counsel, Bill Padding, and In-House Ethics Training, 44 AKRON L. REV. 679, 711–12 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the Conference on Psychology and Lawyering that Professor Jean 
Sternlight hosted at the William S. Boyd School of Law,3 the two of us spoke 
about the psychology of legal ethics. Drawing on the humanities background 
that one of us has4 and the social science background of the other,5 we dis-
                                                        
3  Conference on Psychology and Lawyering: Coalescing the Field, UNLV WILLIAM S. 
BOYD SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.law.unlv.edu/PsychologyLawyering2014 (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2015). 
4  Randy D. Gordon, GARDERE, http://www.gardere.com/Professionals/Randy-D-Gordon/ 
(last visited June 10, 2015). 
5  Nancy B. Rapoport, UNLV WILLIAM S. BOYD SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.law.unlv.edu 
/faculty/nancy-rapoport.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2015); see also Curriculum Vitae, Nancy 
B. Rapoport, available at http://www.law.unlv.edu/sites/default/files/faculty/resumes 
/rapoport_cv_5_15_15.pdf. 
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cussed the importance of understanding the incentives that encourage lawyers 
to behave in certain ways.6 We still believe that the incentives that organiza-
tions develop—intentionally (through policies and procedures) or inadvertently 
(through the unintended consequences of those policies and procedures)—have 
profound effects on behavior, but we also believe that an understanding of how 
to use the classical concept of “virtue”7—as the development of habits that 
shape character—can help people interact with those incentives. In particular, 
we want to explore the concept of “virtue” as it relates to billable behavior: 
How should lawyers bill clients? Is it possible for lawyers to develop some bill-
ing habits that will make it easier for them to bill more ethically? And should 
law firms care?8 
I. “VIRTUE” IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE CULTURE(S) OF LAW FIRMS 
Most everyone would agree, we think, that there are things about the prac-
tice of law that make it meaningfully different from other occupations and that 
there are things about law firms that—at least traditionally—make them mean-
ingfully different from other organizational forms. These differences manifest 
in two ways that are important to our discussion. First, the practice of law both 
ethically and with skill requires lawyers to develop and maintain law-specific 
habits of mind. Second, law firms mature into unique cultures that—depending 
on the shape and substance of that culture—either impede or promote the vir-
tues congenial to those salutary law-specific habits of mind. 
A. The “Two Cultures” of Legal Education and Law Practice 
Over fifty years ago, C.P. Snow examined—and decried—the rise of what 
he called the “two cultures.”9 Snow used this metaphor to capture what he saw 
as an inability to communicate between10 communities of scientists and com-
munities of literary intellectuals. His two-culture metaphor seems basically 
right to us,11 and we think that it may be useful to frame our discussion of vir-
tue with the notion of “culture” in the Snowian12 sense of how groups of similar 
                                                        
6  For a longer discussion of incentives and lawyer behavior, see, e.g., Nancy B. Rapoport, 
“Nudging” Better Lawyer Behavior: Using Default Rules and Incentives to Change Behav-
ior in Law Firms, 4 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 42 (2014). 
7  At least one of us believes that it is less important that a person be ethical than it is that she 
behave as if she were ethical. See infra note 161. 
8  We think that law firms do care. For one thing, more and more of them are analyzing  
their bills to mine useful data about billing patterns. See, e.g., Aric Press, What the Rise  
of Pricing Officers Says About Big Law’s Future, AM. LAW. (July 3, 2014), 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202661735831. 
9  C.P. SNOW, THE TWO CULTURES vii–viii (1998). 
10  To comprehend across, really. 
11  Though subject to qualification and criticism (much of which he himself anticipated and 
conceded). 
12  If “Snowian” isn’t a word, it should be. And Paul Horwitz has suggested, in a Facebook 
post, that academics should consider using “-ish” instead of “-ian.” We’re cool with the non-
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people almost instinctively respond alike to a problem, situation, or subject. By 
way of preview, we’ll posit that two “cultural” obstacles stand in the way of 
“virtue” in the legal profession: first, separate cultures have grown up around 
legal education and legal practice; and second, legal practice itself has migrated 
from one culture (professionalism) to another (commerce). Each of these diver-
gences is antithetical to the notion of virtue, for two reasons: first, because the 
legal education/legal practice divide has engendered mutual suspicion between 
enterprises that should operate in tandem, and second, because the profes-
sion/commerce migration has forced an attendant focus from the internal goods 
of legal practice (being a skilled lawyer) to the external goods of legal practice 
(making money and enhancing one’s prestige). But before moving to specifics, 
we need to pause and consider what virtues should obtain in the context of law, 
and that means that we’re about to get a little bit hoity-toity about the concept 
of virtue. 
B. “Virtue” in the Classical Sense 
In heroic societies (think of the Iliad13 or Beowulf14), virtues and people’s 
roles were inseparable, and the concept of virtue coincided with the notion of 
excellence (e.g., a great runner displays excellence of the feet).15 Not surpris-
ingly, given the tribal and war-like nature of heroic societies, courage was con-
sidered to be a high virtue—one tangled up with notions of loyalty, kinship, 
and success. By the time of Aristotle, the concept of one’s “role” in a culture 
gave way to the importance of the polis (i.e., the city-state form of social struc-
ture), the vestiges of which still exist in institutions dedicated to the common 
good (e.g., hospitals, philanthropic organizations, and we would submit, once 
upon a time, law firms).16 Accordingly, values like judgment, friendship,17 and 
justice emerged as important institutional virtues.18 It’s not surprising then, that 
we still find these virtues itemized in general discussions of virtues in all the 
professions. But law—if not quite an autonomous discipline—also has a partic-
ular telos,19 and we must accordingly attend to law’s own goals if we are to 
identify virtues that facilitate their attainment. 
                                                                                                                                
word “Snowish,” but we’ll stick with the non-word “Snowian” for this article. Paul Horwitz, 
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/paul.horwitz.3  (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
13  HOMER, THE ILIAD (Robert Fagles trans., 1991). 
14  BEOWULF: A NEW VERSE TRANSLATION (Seamus Heaney trans., 2000). 
15  ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 122 (2d ed. 1984). 
16  See id. at 155. 
17  Id. at 156. Defined back then as a shared recognition and pursuit of a good. Id. 
18  Id. at 155–56. We could, of course, look elsewhere for a catalogue of virtues, ranging 
from Ben Franklin’s utility-derived aphorisms to Jane Austen’s emphasis on amiability and 
constancy. Id. at 181–87, 239–43. But the Law Journal’s editors gave us a page limit, and 
we promised to stick to it. 
19  A “telos” is an “end”—i.e., a purpose or goal. THE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 557 (Da-
gobert D. Runes ed., 2001); cf. MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 184–85. 
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C. “Practice” as a Synonym of Sorts of “Profession” 
To help us sort out what virtues should obtain in the practice of law, we 
think it’s helpful to consider the concept of a “practice” that Alasdair Mac-
Intyre develops in his book After Virtue.20 There, MacIntyre proposes this 
mouthful: 
[A practice is] any coherent and complex form of socially established coop-
erative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are 
realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which 
are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the re-
sult that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the 
ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.21 
Once an activity becomes “institutionalized” (in Neil MacCormick’s sense 
of the word),22 it qualifies as a “practice” (in MacIntyre’s sense of that word).23 
Here are a few of the contrasting examples that MacIntyre suggests should 
sharpen the understanding of a “practice”: tic-tac-toe is not a practice, chess is; 
throwing a ball—even with skill—is not a practice, football is; bricklaying is 
not a practice, architecture is.24 By these lights, we think that we can safely cat-
egorize “lawyer-work” as a practice.25 
What, then, are the virtues associated with practices? To get us started 
down this path, MacIntyre suggests a tentative definition of a virtue: “A virtue 
is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to en-
able us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of 
which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.”26 He goes on to 
name “justice, courage and truthfulness” as common virtues.27 Not surprisingly, 
these virtues show up in most discussions of legal virtue, with “justice” occu-
pying the place of preeminence and rising to the level of the telos for the whole 
enterprise.28 To this list, legal commentators often add things like prudence, 
compassion, and wisdom.29 
                                                        
20  MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 187. 
21  Id. Yes, we too had to read that quote over about thirty times to understand it. 
22  NEIL MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY 21 (2007). 
23  MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 187. 
24  If you were thinking of Jacobellis v. Ohio while reading this sentence, we wouldn’t blame 
you. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that 
he knows pornography “when [he] see[s] it”). 
25  Judge Posner makes a similar point in identifying law as a “profession” in a way that 
business is not. For him, the distinguishing mark of a profession is its requirement that a per-
son “master[] a body of formal knowledge.” Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Juris-
prudence, 69 IND. L. J. 1, 5 (1993). He further compartmentalizes law as a restricted profes-
sion in that entry into it requires satisfaction of numerous prerequisites (education, licensing, 
etc.). Id. at 6. 
26  MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 191. 
27  Id. at 194. 
28  One of us can’t resist this quote from Deuteronomy 16:18–21:9: 
Judges and officers shall you appoint in all your gates, which the Lord your G[-]d gives 
you, throughout your tribes; and they shall judge the people with just judgment. You shall not 
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D. The Cultures of Legal Education and Legal Practice 
With this backcloth stitched into place, we want to return to the twin cul-
tural obstacles to identifying virtue in law: the divide between legal education 
and law practice, on the one hand, and within legal practice, on the other. Judge 
Richard Posner has suggested that the legal system in the United States has de-
veloped along the lines of a cartel.30 That cartel formed, in large part, first be-
cause of changes in the training of lawyers31 and then because of resulting 
changes in the licensing of lawyers. 
1. The Development of Formal Legal Education 
Throughout the Nineteenth Century, educational standards rose, and by the 
time that the Twentieth Century was starting to appear on the horizon, a move-
ment to make the practice of law32 a restricted occupation started to develop. 
Posner and others date the beginnings of this movement to 1870, when Chris-
topher Columbus Langdell—the then-dean of Harvard Law School—
revolutionized legal education.33 Langdell believed that law was a science and 
that opinions written by appellate judges were the raw materials of this branch 
of science.34 So, in Langdell’s view, just as geologists study rocks and zoolo-
gists study animals, lawyers should study published case opinions through a 
lengthy curriculum. As Posner somewhat wryly observes,35 this curriculum be-
came mandatory for those wanting to enter the profession.36 And for the new 
system to jell completely, it required the abolition of the centuries-old practice 
                                                                                                                                
pervert judgment; you shall not respect persons, nor take a bribe; for a bribe blinds the eyes of 
the wise, and perverts the words of the righteous. Justice, justice shall you pursue, that you may 
live, and inherit the land which the Lord your G[-]d gives you. 
1 SOLOMON SIMON & MORRISON DAVID BIAL, THE RABBI’S BIBLE, TORAH 201 (1966). This 
whole idea of justice as law’s goal goes back a long way. 
29  Prudence, compassion, and wisdom, by the way, happen to overlap in good part with the 
list of physician virtues that people like Jennifer Radden and John Sadler have proposed in 
another professional context. See JENNIFER RADDEN AND JOHN Z. SADLER, THE VIRTUOUS 
PSYCHIATRIST: CHARACTER ETHICS IN PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE 14 (2010). And just as an 
aside, we think that this substantial overlap between physician and lawyer virtues gives at 
least slight evidential weight to the credibility of MacIntyre’s posited link between virtues 
and practices. 
30  Posner, supra note 25, at 1–2. 
31  For a discussion of the development of one early law school, along with a bit of shame-
less self-promotion on the part of one of us, see Nancy B. Rapoport, Plus Ça Change, Plus 
C’est La Même Chose, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 55, 56–57 (2013). 
32  And, coincidentally, medicine. See, e.g., supra note 29. 
33  See Posner, supra note 25, at 15. We wouldn’t blame current law students for resenting 
Langdell. 
34  Id. 
35  He’s good at that sort of thing. 
36  Posner, supra note 25, at 15. One can contrast, then, the study of law with that of the sci-
ences—one doesn’t have to have a degree in a particular scientific discipline in order to “do” 
science or to invent something. 
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of prospective lawyers entering the profession through a process of apprentice-
ship combined with self-study (“reading the law”). 
It took some time for the Langdellian law school system to attain a monop-
oly over lawyer training.37 But, as Posner notes, “by 1960, four years of college 
. . . plus three years at an accredited law school,” plus things like bar examina-
tions and good character requirements, “formed a series of hoops through 
which almost everyone who wanted to become a licensed practitioner of law in 
this country had to jump.”38 At the same time, state prohibitions against the un-
authorized practice of law put teeth into these new educational requirements 
and thereby created what antitrust lawyers call a “bottleneck” at the law school 
level. So what are the consequences of the near-complete ascendancy of the 
Langdellian system? 
That system has created a number of economic incentives for universities, 
because consumers (prospective lawyers) have to buy the product at cartel pric-
es, and the product is relatively cheap to deliver (large lecture classes capped 
by a single examination at the end of the semester). Simply put, law schools 
can be relatively profitable39 (compared to typical humanities departments, with 
low student-to-faculty ratios and relatively lower tuition), and they can be start-
ed with a relatively low capital investment (compared to medical or engineer-
ing schools, which need labs). Second, as Philip Kissam has argued,40 the 
Langdellian41 system propagates itself across every aspect of law schools in a 
manner that he likens to a Foucaultian42 discipline, by which he means a “sub-
terranean and habitual system of routine practices and tacit lessons” that serve 
to resist change and blunt any institutional development.43 The chain of 
Kissam’s argument is too long to follow here,44 but one of its segments is worth 
pausing to consider, especially since it pretty much squares with two of the 
most discussed recent critiques of legal education,45 Educating Lawyers (popu-
                                                        
37  Id. at 15 (“As late as 1951, twenty percent of American lawyers had not graduated from 
law school, and fifty percent had not graduated from college.”); see also Rapoport, supra 
note 31, at 55 (describing the history of New York University’s first law school). 
38  Posner, supra note 25, at 15. 
39  Although one of us wants to point out that, at least for state law schools, that profitability 
can be destroyed by the way that the state decides to fund legal education. 
40  PHILIP C. KISSAM, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW SCHOOLS: THE MAKING OF MODERN LAWYERS 
7 (2003). 
41  Cf. supra note 12; see also Aside, The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 
U. PA. L. REV. 1474, 1474 nn. 1 & 4 (1975). 
42  Want to know about Michel Foucault? See Michel Foucault, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (May 22, 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/foucault/. 
43  KISSAM, supra note 40, at 4. 
44  Trust us. 
45  Brian Tamanaha’s book, Failing Law Schools, is a third. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING 
LAW SCHOOLS (2012). For a partial list of reviews of that book, see Paul Caron, More Re-
views of Tamanaha’s Failing Law Schools, TAXPROF BLOG (Feb. 13, 2014), 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/02/more-reviews.html. 
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larly known as the Carnegie Report)46 and Roy Stuckey’s Best Practices.47 
Kissam, Stuckey, and the authors of the Carnegie Report all make the same 
point when they contend that the Langdellian system doesn’t produce “practice-
ready” graduates of the sort that come out of trade schools, or even out of uni-
versity-level programs in education, pharmacy, or medicine. 
Of course, until fairly recently, most law firms didn’t complain all that 
much about the lack of practical training in their new hires. The recent change 
of heart is one worth exploring because we’ll find that it’s emblematic of the 
other cultural change that we want to emphasize: the migration of law practice 
from a professional culture to a commercial culture. There’s a straight line from 
the liminal moment between law practice as a profession and law practice as 
commerce directly to the billing issue that is our principal focus in this article. 
2. Law Practice and the Changes in Training New Lawyers After 
Graduation 
That straight line is intersected by a change in how new lawyers actually 
learn how to practice. There never was, of course, a “golden age” of law prac-
tice in which lawyers toiled harmoniously in the Garden of Justice.48 But it’s 
fair to say that law practice has become less professionally focused and more 
commercially focused over the past few decades.49 As a consequence, yet an-
other impediment has been placed in the lawyer’s road to virtue. And all this 
bottom-line commercialism has exacerbated the legal education/law practice 
divide, because practicing lawyers have diminished the important role that they 
once played in both legal scholarship and new lawyer training.50 
If a lawyer from 1950 were parachuted into the present, we suspect that the 
most startling change that he51 would notice in the legal landscape would be the 
overall number of lawyers and the size (both in terms of number of lawyers and 
geographic scope) of law firms. Two statistical examples can illustrate this 
point: in 1951, there were about 220,000 lawyers; in 2000, this number was 
well over a million. In the late 1950s, fewer than forty firms in the U.S. had fif-
ty lawyers or more; now there are around two dozen that number close to or 
                                                        
46  WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION 
OF LAW (2007). 
47  ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007). 
48  Cf. Iron Butterfly—In A Gadda Da Vida, YOUTUBE (June 19, 2008), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2bQZ6l_cq5Y. 
49  See, e.g., Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big but Brittle: Economic Perspectives on 
the Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 92; 
Rapoport, supra note 6. 
50  Hence, the present attempt to push more experiential and practical training back into the 
law schools. 
51  And it would almost inevitably have been a “he” back then. 
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over one thousand lawyers.52 Lots of factors caused that explosion in the num-
ber of lawyers, but our point is that the explosion is a real phenomenon.53 Until 
relatively recently, when various pressures caused law firms to rethink their 
business models, there was a lot of money to be made in law by those who 
could grab it. And one way to “grab it” was to create very large, highly lever-
aged firms (i.e., lots of associates and few equity partners) that could siphon off 
“premium” work at premium rates.54 
With the rise of large, highly leveraged law firms came the transition from 
profession to business—and with that transition came the transition to metrics 
that created disincentives for lawyers to spend any non-billable time training 
new lawyers.55 Reward systems reflect a firm’s values far more accurately than 
do “mission statements,” “value statements,” and letterhead slogans. When the 
reward systems involve only factors that relate to billable time, then value-
maximizing lawyers will focus on billable time to the exclusion of any other 
things that might inure to their firm’s benefit.56 
Most firms keep two types of statistics from which nearly all promotion 
and compensation decisions are made: “originations,” which tracks who 
brought the work into the firm, and paid billable hours.57 Consequently, as Wil-
liam Henderson observes, none of this statistical myopia is lost on law firm 
partners, who often valorize these metrics, rank them well above other values, 
and slip into the short-term thinking that those metrics represent: 
                                                        
52  Jake Simpson, Law360 Reveals 400 Largest US Law Firms, LAW360 (Mar.  
23, 2014, 9:45 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/518950/law360-reveals-400-larg 
est-us-law-firms. 
53  Why the explosion in the number of lawyers? There are many reasons, among them the 
breakdown of the cartel that had restricted membership by race, class, and gender, the grow-
ing propensity of corporations to move work from firm to firm (or to parcel work out to dif-
ferent firms), a surge in government regulations, and an explosion in litigation fueled in part 
by relaxed class-action rules, a judicial receptiveness to punitive damages awards, and a 
willingness by courts to wander into areas that had once been marked off as “political.” 
54  This leverage came at a cost in terms of the older “partnership” model in which the part-
ners actually knew one another, socialized together, and made decisions as a group. One of 
the now-retired members of Randy’s firm used to talk about how all the lawyers at Gardere, 
Porter & DeHay (an earlier incarnation of his firm) would sit around a table on Saturday 
morning and open the mail together. Now, large firms are impersonal—they’re bureaucra-
cies, really—and, according to Abe Krash, a retired Arnold & Porter partner, 
Decisions . . . that were once influenced in significant part by tradition, loyalty, and regard for 
past contributions to the firm are determined by bottom-line, objective factors. The lock-step 
system of compensation has been replaced by an “eat-what-you-kill” system geared toward 
business generation. The relations among partners, and between partners and associates, are 
shaped to a great extent by considerations of profitability. 
Abe Krash, The Changing Legal Profession, WASH. LAW., Jan. 2008, at 30, 33. 
55  For a discussion of how incentives can change law firm behavior, see Rapoport, supra 
note 6. 
56  See id. 
57  Clients may not pay all of their bills and may negotiate with their lawyers to reduce their 
bills, see, e.g., id. at 46–48, so “paid” time matters more than mere “billed” time. 
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This incentive problem, which focuses a lawyer’s attention on the current 
fiscal year, is evident in a 2012 survey of over 2200 partners at major law firms. 
. . .  
When asked to assess the importance of various factors that are considered 
in determining compensation at their firms, origination of business was ranked 
as the most important factor (74 [percent] picking “very important”) followed by 
revenues generated through that partner’s work for clients (59 [percent]). In con-
trast, management responsibilities was selected as “very important” by only 9 
[percent] of respondents; and only 10 [percent] of respondents reported that 
good citizenship was very important. When asked what was “most important” in 
determining compensation, 65 [percent] selected origination followed by 21 
[percent] for working attorney receipts.58 
To make matters worse, these seemingly “objective” metrics mask an un-
derlying set of contingencies, ranging from how the business was generated 
(for example, is it “new” or from a hundred-year client?) to why the client 
didn’t pay for the hours billed (was the work shoddy, or was the client a dead-
beat?). The supposed objectivity of the statistics is further undermined because 
they at once show too much and too little.59 For instance, suppose Partner X is 
credited with $1,000,000 in business originations. But what if he’s a terrible 
lawyer? What if the business came in through a cold call to the switchboard? 
What if he runs off every potential rival in his practice area, each of whom goes 
on to be a very successful lawyer at another firm? Or what if he actually turns 
off five potential clients for every one that he lands? 
So why do firms use such metrics when they so clearly serve to enhance 
only the external goods of the practice (i.e., money and its collateral prestige)? 
The short answer is lawyer mobility. At one point, most firms were organized 
under the Cravath model,60 in which firms hired the “best and brightest” from 
law school, eventually made some of those hires into partners for life, and ex-
ported the rest to positions with clients, the government, or firms in regional 
markets. There were virtually no lateral moves at the partnership level, a situa-
tion facilitated by stable client relationships. But as client loyalty waned, a 
market developed for lawyers with portable business. Thus, although many 
partners would, as Galanter and Henderson have put it, 
gladly trade a portion of their earnings for a shorter workweek, greater job secu-
rity, more interesting work, the opportunity to mentor (or be mentored), do more 
pro bono work, or take a long, uninterrupted vacation . . . , these aspirations are 
                                                        
58  William D. Henderson, From Big Law to Lean Law, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 5, 10–11 
(2013) (footnotes omitted). 
59  For you baseball nuts out there, think about how Randy’s fellow Kansans Bill James and 
Michael Lewis have shown that the statistical conventional wisdom can be counterproduc-
tive—even wrong. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR 
GAME (2003). 
60  Named after the elite New York firm Cravath, Swain & Moore. See, e.g., William D. 
Henderson, Three Generations of U.S. Lawyers: Generalists, Specialists, Project Managers, 
70 MD. L. REV. 373, 376–77 (2011); Eli Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish 
Law Firms, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1803, 1807–08 (2008). 
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virtually impossible to negotiate when rainmaking partners located in multiple 
offices through the world are free to exit at any time with clients in tow.61 
In effect, then, the internal goods of the practice (being an excellent lawyer 
who serves clients well) are held hostage to the external (money and pres-
tige).62 
What the devolution from the internal to the external means is that Aristo-
telian “friendship” (i.e., the virtue that holds institutions together) is no longer 
possible in law firms.63 Indeed, the friendship bond has been replaced by a per-
vasive sense of anxiety: competitors are always poaching key clients; younger 
lawyers aren’t developing strong loyalties because they see their future riddled 
with contingencies; management is focusing on deceptive metrics; and even 
highly successful partners can see their careers hit the rocks after a major client 
defects to another firm.64 Above all, as one commentator tartly puts it, “[l]arge 
firms view good lawyers as expendable.”65 As a consequence: 
For the vast majority of modern large law firms, economics rather than cul-
ture are the glue that holds the firm together. Indeed, the distinguishing feature 
of the elastic tournament is a constant focus on the real or imagined marginal 
product of each lawyer in the firm—associates, of counsel, sundry off-track at-
torneys, and equity and non-equity partners. Although this system is remarkably 
effective at maximizing the financial return on (at least some) human capital, it 
simultaneously undermines or hinders other values cherished by the profes-
sion.66 
That economic conundrum leads us back into the legal education issue with 
which we started—and will lead us further into the billing thickets that have 
entangled the profession. In the past, new lawyers learned to apply their legal 
education through a combination of watching and doing. Several forces have 
                                                        
61  Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second Transformation 
of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1906–07 (2008). 
62   Lawyers note that compensation shapes culture through the behaviors that it encourages 
and discourages. If a firm pronounces the importance of pro bono work but seems not to take it 
into account in setting compensation, it will be clear to lawyers that the firm does not regard 
time spent on pro bono matters as important. Similarly, if a firm provides compensation credit 
for a partner who takes on non-billable management responsibilities when he could be devoting 
that time to developing his own clients, the firm credibly signals that it values partners who are 
willing to make some personal sacrifices on behalf of the firm as a whole. 
Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Lisa H. Rohrer, Money and Meaning: The Moral Economy of Law 
Firm Compensation, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 74, 80 (2012). For another powerful indication 
of the importance of a law firm’s culture, see Jennifer Smith, The Downside of Luring  
Lateral Partners, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Oct. 20, 2014 11:37 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/10/20/the-downsides-of-lurling-lateral-partners/ (“While 
money is of course one motivation for switching firms, the number one reason cited by sur-
vey respondents [of lateral partners] was firm culture.”). 
63  Bernie Burk and Dave McGowan make this point in a wonderful article. See Burk & 
McGowan, supra note 49. 
64  Galanter & Henderson, supra note 61, at 1898. 
65  Id. at 1911 (quoting Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principle of 
Pragmatism, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 631, 690 (2005)). 
66  Id. at 1907. 
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conspired to undo on-the-job learning. First, large firms have discovered that 
they could increase the number of associates dramatically while holding the 
number of partners steady. But this increase in leverage necessarily means that 
associates spend less time with—and learning from—more senior lawyers. As 
Henderson puts it, high leveraging “makes high quality training, mentoring, 
and monitoring infeasible.”67 The problem here is, of course, that the contem-
porary large law firm’s default incentives run against the very sort of behavior 
that made them successful in the past: 
The increased reliance on leverage draws into sharp relief the tendency of 
Big Law to use its existing reputational capital to maximize short-term profits 
rather than take the steps necessary to build a stronger organization capable of 
taking market share from competitors. The higher leverage makes it much more 
difficult to properly screen, monitor, and train lawyers who are capable of build-
ing the firm’s reputational capital. Further, when we layer on top the increased 
pressure to originate business—to either preserve one’s standing in the firm or 
take advantage of rich payouts available to lateral partners—equity partners lack 
meaningful financial incentives to invest time in the mentoring of junior law-
yers.68 
And as Lawrence Fox astutely observes, the casualties from this process are 
readily identifiable and concrete: 
Loyalty is an early victim, as is the concept of the firm—all for one and one for 
all. Further, if the real rewards go to those with the biggest books of business, 
what happens to other firm responsibilities such as hiring, training, running a 
summer program, pro bono services, bar association work and a myriad of other 
areas of endeavor? They still might get done but they will be done by individu-
als who will be under-rewarded for their efforts, sadly reflecting the reality that 
law as business has driven out so much of what we valued and celebrated about 
law as a learned and committed profession.69 
Then, too, as the number of technically sophisticated lawyers has increased 
(often outstripping demand), “[t]his reality strongly reduces the incentive of 
clients to subsidize the training of entry-level lawyers, particularly at inflated 
pay scales that are disconnected from the value provided to clients.”70 As Hen-
derson and others have reported many times, some clients now refuse to pay for 
time billed by first- and second-year lawyers, which exacerbates the associate-
development problem, because meaningful “briefcase carrying” represents 
money out of pocket for the firm.71 
                                                        
67  Henderson, supra note 58, at 6. 
68  Id. at 10. 
69  Lawrence J. Fox, The End of Partnership, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 245, 248 (2005). 
70  Henderson, supra note 60, at 380. 
71  Id. at 387. Adding to the problem, as large firms have migrated exclusively to premium 
work at premium prices, the steady flow of small cases and transactions that junior lawyers 
could once credibly handle with minimal supervision have evaporated. For a long period in 
which revenues increased dramatically almost every year, large firms filled the development 
gap with sophisticated (and expensive) professional development programs. Although these 
programs enjoyed some success, they also—not universally, of course—suffered from some 
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The takeaway from all this for new lawyers is that money (and the billable 
hours that generate it) matters above all, even though most everyone knows at 
some visceral level that a law firm “cannot credibly compete on the basis of 
quality when it underinvests in its most important asset—legal talent.”72 And 
that takeaway leads to another: that new lawyers aren’t being trained in how to 
bill. If law firms want to remain ethical as well as solvent, they must be more 
responsive to the increasing client demands for transparency and economy. To 
both of us, that means that law firms must encourage habits that let even the 
newest lawyers bill ethically. So let’s turn to virtue ethics as a way to encour-
age those habits. 
II. VIRTUE ETHICS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO LAWYER BEHAVIOR 
Virtue ethics holds one responsible for his or her choices and his or 
her actions, with the requisite consideration that these are affected by 
the facts, circumstances, and actual conditions of one’s personal and 
professional existence in which morality operates. But more importantly, 
persons are held responsible for their character—the sum total of those 
chosen and cultivated traits from which such choices and actions arise. 
Cultivating one’s personal and professional character, and thus acting 
in accordance with it, involves precisely the kind of intentionality that 
underlies the whole project of morality.73 
We’re just two of many who have hopped on the virtue ethics bandwag-
on.74 The basic gist of virtue ethics is that people are virtuous when they have 
created and follow habits of excellence—habits that inculcate behavior that 
mimic the behavior of the best among us.75 By starting with the question of 
                                                                                                                                
of the same complaint-generating characteristics of law schools, in that they were often de-
signed and run by non-lawyers or lawyers who had left practice after a short period. In any 
event, in recent years, many firms have “attempt[ed] to prop up profitability by slashing en-
try-level hiring and by cutting costs on professional development along with other nonessen-
tial expenses.” Id. at 387–88. 
72  Id. at 388. 
73  Paul J. Saguil, A Virtuous Profession: Re-Conceptualizing Legal Ethics from a Virtue-
Based Moral Philosophy, 22 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 1, 10 (2006). 
74  See, e.g., Andrew B. Ayers, What if Legal Ethics Can’t Be Reduced to a Maxim?, 26 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2013); Caryn L. Beck-Dudley & Steven H. Hanks, On Virtue and Peace: 
Creating a Workplace Where People Can Flourish, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 427 (2003); 
Sherman J. Clark, Law as Communitarian Virtue Ethics, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 757 (2005); 
Ronald J. Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2012); Clark D. 
Cunningham & Charlotte Alexander, Developing Professional Judgment: Law School Inno-
vations in Response to the Carnegie Foundation’s Critique of American Legal Education, in 
THE ETHICS PROJECT IN LEGAL EDUCATION, ch. 5 (Michael Robertson et al. eds., 2011); 
Adrian Evans & Michael King, Reflections on the Connection of Virtue Ethics to Therapeu-
tic Jurisprudence, 35 U.N.S.W. L.J. 717 (2012); Saguil, supra note 73, at 1. 
75   In virtue ethics, the “how” is by means of character and virtue. To virtue ethicists, one 
ought to live life “excellently,” which, in turn, will further the individual’s, and socie-
ty’s, happiness and well-being. Indeed, the classical ethicists on whose shoulders modern 
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how an “excellent” person (in the Aristotelian sense)—in our case, an excellent 
lawyer76—would behave in a particular situation, we can work backwards to 
determine how to develop the habits that would make it more likely to lead to 
the right behavior.77 The trick, of course, is to identify just what habits a virtu-
ous biller might have, so that we could emulate those habits. We will go on to 
identify techniques for monitoring and improving billing practices, but we also 
suggest that observing the way that the very best lawyers bill would be a good 
starting point. The assumption here is that virtuous and ethical lawyers will car-
ry their good habits across the whole of their practices.78 
Neither of us is wedded to the idea that developing habits alone will coun-
teract all of the cognitive pressures that humans encounter.79 It’s probably more 
reasonable to assume that the combination of ethical habits and an awareness of 
cognitive errors is a better way to shape lawyer behavior.80 Those cognitive er-
rors81 can include cognitive dissonance,82 diffusion of responsibility,83 and so-
                                                                                                                                
virtue ethicists stand, endeavored to answer the question: “What is a good life for a human 
being?”; not the more direct and mundane question: “What ought I to do?” 
Colombo, supra note 74, at 10 (footnotes omitted); see also Michael S. McGinniss, Virtue 
Ethics, Earnestness, and the Deciding Lawyer: Human Flourishing in a Legal Community, 
87 N.D. L. REV. 19, 34 (2011) (“[A] virtue ethicist derives the rules of action for persons of 
good character from the virtues themselves, rather than establishing a duty-based rule of ac-
tion first and deciding whether a person is acting in good character solely by determining 
whether he has acted in conformity with the rule.” (footnote omitted)). 
76  The concept of the Aristotelian “excellent lawyer” is different from, say, a lawyer who 
goes around thinking of herself as an excellent lawyer in general. There’s a difference be-
tween someone who has confidence in her own skills (“I’m an excellent lawyer”) and some-
one who thinks of herself as so good that she doesn’t need to pay attention to the ethics of 
what she’s doing. 
77  McGinniss, supra note 75, at 32. 
How does a virtue ethicist go about making moral decisions? First, before asking “what 
should I do?,” a person faced with a moral dilemma should ask “what kind of person should one 
be?” For a virtue ethicist, the answer is that one should be a person of good and virtuous charac-
ter whose actions are consistent with that character. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
78  See Lorie M. Graham, Aristotle’s Ethics and the Virtuous Lawyer: Part One of a Study on 
Legal Ethics and Clinical Education, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 5, 48 (1995–96). 
79   We can now see the important implications of the person-situation debate for character-
based moral theories. The virtue ethics tradition relies on the existence—and presumably on 
some sort of behavioral manifestation—of character traits. As Owen Flanagan puts it, “the entire 
enterprise of virtue ethics depends on there being individual traits of character which are causal-
ly effective in the production of behavior across situations of a kind.” But if Situationism is 
right, human behavior should not be understood as flowing from settled character and, hence, 
virtue ethicists hold an empirically inadequate conception of character traits and, presumably, a 
normatively wrong notion of moral character. 
Miguel Alzola, Character and Environment: The Status of Virtues in Organizations, 78 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 343, 347 (2008) (citations omitted). 
80  Cf. id. at 352–53. (“In any event, there is a middle way between Situationism and Dispo-
sitionalism in organizational scholarship and business ethics. The empirical data support a 
synthetic theory of behavior according to which both of these viewpoints reflect important 
aspects of the truth.”). 
81  One of us has discussed cognitive errors a fair amount, most recently in Rapoport, supra 
note 6, at 44. 
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cial pressure.84 We don’t expect that an awareness of cognitive errors will 
change the way that humans are hard-wired to think, and we don’t think that 
developing ethical habits will make someone more ethical. But we do believe 
that—if we had to choose between trying to make someone who’s not particu-
larly ethical into someone who is actually ethical and developing systems that 
make even the not-ethical person behave as if he were ethical—we’d pick the 
latter. We don’t mind tilting at windmills,85 but we’d rather attack real prob-
lems that might have real solutions. 
III. A RECAP: INCENTIVES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON BILLING BEHAVIOR 
As a general rule, employees respond to  
the incentives that their employers give them.86 
The trick with incentives is that people may think that they’re shaping be-
havior one way, but the very incentives that they put into place often trigger un-
intended consequences that counteract the behavior they want to elicit.87 In 
terms of lawyer billing behavior, hourly billing is a perfect example.88 
                                                                                                                                
82  For an armchair description of cognitive dissonance, see, e.g., Kendra Cherry, What Is 
Cognitive Dissonance?, ABOUT.COM, http://psychology.about.com/od/cognitivepsychology/f 
/dissonance.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
83  See, e.g., Kendra Cherry, What Is Diffusion of Responsibility?, ABOUT.COM, 
http://psychology.about.com/od/dindex/f/diffusion-of-responsibility.htm (last visited Feb. 
23, 2015). 
84  See, e.g., Saul McLeod, Asch Experiment, SIMPLYPSYCHOLOGY (2008), 
http://www.simplypsychology.org/asch-conformity.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
85  Cf. MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, DON QUIXOTE 44–45 (Wordsworth Editions Ltd., 
1998) (1605). 
86  Rapoport, supra note 6, at 44. 
87  One way to think about the problem of unintended consequences is to think about “latent 
functions”: 
There are essentially two methods for attributing goals to a law-related system, the “posi-
tive” and the “normative.” The positive method is to observe the operation of the system, deter-
mine what results it is in fact bringing about, and then to assume that it intends to bring about 
those results. Careful empirical observation of a law-related system almost always reveals that 
the system is doing things and producing results that participants in the system did not intend or 
anticipate. Systems-oriented sociologists refer to them as “latent functions.” Despite their unex-
pected nature, it is appropriate to treat these results as intended. 
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 502–03 (1997) 
(footnotes omitted) (citing to, among other sources, ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY 
AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 63 (1957)). Thanks to Peter Bayer for pointing this idea out. For a 
slightly icky discussion of perverse incentives, see Rapoport, supra note 6, at 108 n. 227 
(discussing the “rat tail” example of how incentives can trigger the exact opposite behavior 
that the incentives were designed to elicit). 
88  Studies of law as one of the “learned” professions (classically: medicine, law, and the 
clergy) naturally compare lawyers and physicians. See, e.g., SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 46. 
For many years, medicine seemed to maintain a degree of insulation from the encroachment 
of “business” motives and evaluative standards. In recent years, though, medicine has been 
infected with its own version of the billable-hour virus, which has come in the forum of re-
imbursement schedules tied to the amount of time that a payer says should have been spent 
on a particular consultation or procedure. See CMS MANUAL SYSTEM, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE 
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Lawyers developed hourly billing as a way of reassuring clients that the 
work that they were doing for the clients was reasonable.89 In a study of the 
economics of hourly billing, George Shepherd and Morgan Cloud suggested 
that the shift to hourly billing from fixed-fee billing stemmed from a change to 
more liberalized discovery rules.90 The documentation of time spent on a par-
ticular matter—as opposed to the classic one-line bill of “for services rendered, 
$x”91—gave clients a way to measure the effort that the lawyers had expended. 
This client-centric92 development, though, then became a way for a law firm to 
“measure . . . the utility of the worker and . . . the success of the firm itself.”93 
                                                                                                                                
& MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. § 20.2(C) (2010), avail- 
able at https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Transmittals/downloads 
/R2121CP.pdf. But there is a difference: in law, incremental billing is intended to serve as a 
damper on how much a client must pay (but provides an incentive to pile up more billable 
hours); in medicine, incremental billing is also intended to keep costs down (but provides  
an incentive to spend as little time as possible with a patient). See David Frenz, Is  
Time Really on Your Side?, TODAY’S HOSPITALIST,  Aug. 2012, available at 
http://www.todayshospitalist.com/index.php?b=articles_read&cnt=1515 (“Hospitalists are 
also generally aware that they can bill based on time. While seemingly attractive—think of 
that chatty patient or family member who won’t let you escape—there are caveats and head-
aches that reduce its utility.”). For all we know, the clergy has (or will!) implement time-
based efficiency metrics. 
89  Susan Fortney made a related point to one of us in an email. See E-mail from Susan Fort-
ney, Dir., Inst. for the Study of Legal Ethics, to Nancy Rapoport, (June 29, 2014, 6:40 PM) 
[hereinafter Fortney E-mail] (on file with author Rapoport) (“On the development of billable 
hour practice, I believe that consultants actually promoted billable hour practice as a way for 
lawyers to capture their efforts and make more money.”) (draft attached to email). 
90  See George B. Shepherd & Morgan Cloud, Time and Money: Discovery Leads to Hourly 
Billing, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 94. 
The profession was pushed irresistibly to hourly billing by economic pressures that resulted from 
the introduction of rules that permitted wide-open pretrial discovery. By creating unbearable cost 
uncertainty for lawyers who handled litigation matters, wide-open discovery forced lawyers, and 
surprisingly their institutional clients, to demand that the traditional forms of fixed fees be aban-
doned in favor of hourly billing. 
Id. (footnote omitted). Kudos to Bernie Burk for pointing us in this direction. 
91  See, e.g., Stuart L. Pardau, Bill, Baby, Bill: How the Billable Hour Emerged as the Prima-
ry Method of Attorney Fee Generation and Why Early Reports of its Demise May Be Greatly 
Exaggerated, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 2–6 (2013). 
92  Well, hourly billing was also a way for lawyers to cost-shift to clients the risks of under-
pricing an engagement. See Shepherd & Cloud, supra note 90, at 95–96. 
As cost uncertainty increases, the lawyer’s risk-bearing costs under the fixed-fee contract in-
crease. If cost uncertainty increases sufficiently, then the risk costs that the fixed-fee contract 
imposes on the lawyer will eventually exceed the fixed-fee contract’s moral-hazard-reducing 
benefits. At that point, the lawyer will be better off under hourly billing, even after compensat-
ing the client for accepting the cost uncertainty and the moral hazard. 
Id. 
93  Dennis Curtis & Judith Resnik, Teaching Billing: Metrics of Value in Law Firms and Law 
Schools, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1412 (2002) (reviewing DEBORAH L. RHODES, IN THE 
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000)) 
Hours are a factor in deciding salary levels, raises, bonuses, and promotions. Firms may also use 
hourly records to equalize work among associates, to calculate “utilization” of associates (how 
associates are measuring up to the firm’s hourly requirements), and to calculate a “realization” 
figure (how much the firm has actually collected for an associate’s work). 
Id. 
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The more billable hours racked up (at least, the more billable hours that result-
ed in income for the firm), the better off the firm expected its finances to be. 
Billable hours can provide some information about how “productive” a 
lawyer is and how profitable her firm is94—but, to paraphrase Jane Austen,95 it 
is a truth universally acknowledged that when firms base their reward struc-
tures on billable hour totals,96 they’re encouraging billing abuse, which is a par-
ticularly virulent form of unethical behavior.97 
When we say “unethical,” we don’t mean that the behavior is intentionally 
dishonest.98 (Some billing errors are dishonest, of course, but many billing er-
rors are inadvertent.) Cognitive errors such as cognitive dissonance and social 
                                                        
94  See, e.g., Jesse Nelman, A Little Trust Can Go a Long Way Toward Saving the Billable 
Hour, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 717, 722 (2010) (“The billable hour can be salvaged through 
education in the form of modest regulation and the development of proper billing judgment 
for associates. This approach will provide lawyers with the notice and guidance they need to 
develop and sustain ethical billing practices despite pressure to perhaps do otherwise.”). 
95  JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 3 (Arc Manor 2008) (1813) (“It is a truth universally 
acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be in want of a 
wife.”). 
96  Objective compensation systems that do not recognize and reward other contributions, such as 
management and supervision time, discourage partners from devoting time to such activities. At-
torneys functioning in such a system face tremendous pressure to bill hours and generate busi-
ness, making it difficult for them to devote time to “non revenue” producing endeavors, such as 
training and supervision. As described by Professor Patrick Schiltz, the “pressure to bill hours—
pressure to ‘bill or be banished’—is necessarily pressure not to mentor.” Similarly, the emphasis 
on business generation can undermine meaningful supervision because an “hour devoted to 
bringing in business is valued much more today than an hour devoted to mentoring a junior col-
league.” 
Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm 
Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239, 281–82 
(2000) (footnotes omitted). Prof. Fortney, in commenting on an earlier draft of this article, 
noted that billing abuses are more likely when billing partners are “unwilling or unable to 
monitor the bill.” Fortney E-mail, supra note 89. 
97  Lots of people have tried to parse out why lawyers overbill. For example, James Schratz 
did an interesting piece in the late 1990s talking about possible psychological reasons for 
overbilling. James P. Schratz, I Told You to Fire Nicholas Farber—A Psychological and So-
ciological Analysis of Why Attorneys Overbill, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2211 (1998); see also 
Adam C. Altman, To Bill, or Not to Bill?: Lawyers Who Wear Watches Almost Always Do, 
Although Ethical Lawyers Actually Think About It First, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 203 
(1998); Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data on the Problems 
and Pressure Points, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171 (2005); Lawrence J. Fox, Save Us from 
Ourselves, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2189 (1998); Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regula-
tion of Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205 (1999); Pardau, 
supra note 91; Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1130–31 (2013); William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by At-
torneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1991); W Bradley Wendel, In Search of Core Values, 16 
LEGAL ETHICS 350 (2013). 
98  See Lisa G. Lerman, A Double Standard for Lawyer Dishonesty: Billing Fraud Versus 
Misappropriation, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 847, 868–69 (2006) (distinguishing between types of 
billing mistakes that do, and don’t, involve dishonesty). 
Spring 2015] VIRTUOUS BILLING 715 
pressure99 can lead lawyers to make choices that benefit themselves more than 
they do the client. Lisa Lerman provides a useful example of the way in which 
subconscious choices can cost a client money: 
[A lawyer] offered as an example one situation in which a company hired 
his firm and another firm to work on two very similar matters. His firm “did an 
exhaustive $100,000 job and produced a two-inch binder filled with memos. The 
other firm did a fifteen page memo that cost about $5,000.” The client was “ini-
tially kind of horrified at the difference.” 
In explaining how this happened, [the interviewed lawyer] said, “It had 
something to do with the fact that the partner who had the matter in our firm felt 
that he had to get his billings up—thought he had to make a strong impression 
on the firm at that point in his career. And he had people around who could do 
the work for him.”100 
Had the lawyer doing the $100,000 job made a habit of asking himself if he 
could do the work faster and cheaper, maybe the client wouldn’t have been 
stuck with a large bill. On the other hand, maybe the incentives within that law 
firm discourage its lawyers from developing such a habit: those types of habits 
likely make it more difficult for law firms to turn a profit. Both of us have 
faced the pressures of having to bill significant hours, and we both believe that 
those pressures can be inordinate in a climate of shrinking law firm profits. To 
us, the pressures caused by the hourly billing metric demonstrate that “the situ-
ation” can cause more problems than could possibly be blamed on “bad” peo-
ple. It’s not character;101 it’s context. 
Even when a lawyer wants to behave appropriately and bill accurately, a 
firm’s use of incentives that are based on hourly billing metrics will put law-
yers who work efficiently at a disadvantage.102 In 2000, Susan Saab Fortney 
conducted a survey of one thousand Texas associates, who had been licensed 
for no more than ten years and who worked in firms of more than ten attor-
neys.103 Some of her respondents described the types of problems (the competi-
tive disadvantages that efficient lawyers face; the pressure to lie; the tendency 
toward self-deception) created by using billable hours as the main metric for 
rewards.104 Her 2005 study reinforced her earlier findings.105 On the one hand, 
                                                        
99  Rapoport, supra note 6, at 58–59 & nn.55–61 (describing cognitive dissonance, diffusion 
of responsibility, social pressure, and anchoring errors as they might relate to lawyer behav-
ior). 
100  Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 707 (1990) (footnote and al-
terations omitted). 
101  Well, ok: sometimes, it’s character. 
102  Susan Fortney reported this observation in, among other articles, Fortney, supra note 97, 
at 177–78 (linking the incentives of billable hours to overwork). 
103  Fortney, supra note 96, at 243–44 (reporting a final response rate of 55.2 percent). For an 
Australian survey of billable hour issues, see generally Christine Parker & David Ruschena, 
The Pressures of Billable Hours: Lessons From a Survey of Billing Practices Inside Law 
Firms, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 619 (2011). 
104  Fortney, supra note 96, at 279; see also id. at 275 (associate pointing out that the quest 
for high billable hours leaves no room for discussion about the quality of the work). 
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the more efficient lawyer will have more time to take on more projects, because 
she can complete her work in a shorter time; but she will also face the pressure 
of her peers if she consistently demonstrates that they might be working too 
slowly, and she may resent the fact that she’s working harder than some of her 
peers. 
We’ve read articles about the unseemly side of billing by the hour, such as 
the story about a law firm being sued by its client for overbilling.106 When a 
major firm sends emails107 that say, “Churn that bill, baby” and “That bill shall 
know no limits,” something is off-kilter. That behavior is venal. But even when 
a firm discourages such unethical behavior, the pressures of law firm econom-
ics and the metrics of hourly billing create temptations. 
To be fair, law firms have to be able to make a profit, and to make a profit, 
they have to be able to cover salaries, partner draws, and overhead. The higher 
the fixed costs (and, for that matter, the variable costs), the more likely it is that 
a firm will decide not to scrutinize certain billing behaviors too closely unless it 
is forced to do so by, say, a court.108 But there is a practical reason for a law 
firm to think hard about how its incentives can affect its employees’ behavior: 
billing mistakes that lead to client dissatisfaction will result in less income to 
the firm. Hours that are improperly billed are lost forever. There’s no way to 
recoup that lost time if the client refuses to pay for it. So part of a firm’s re-
sponsibility is to think hard about how its incentives affect the quality of its 
work product and the behavior of its employees; another part is to think about 
how to inculcate the habits that will help its employees behave ethically as con-
sistently as possible. 
                                                                                                                                
105  See generally Fortney, supra note 97 (2005). 
106  See Peter Lattman, Suit Offers a Peek at the Practice of Inflating a Legal Bill, 
DEALBOOK, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2013, 3:36 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013 
/03/25/suit-offers-a-peek-at-the-practice-of-padding-a-legal-bill/. For the law firm’s internal 
memo stating that the emails were intended as a joke, see David Lat, Overbilling Gone Wild: 
Paying the (DLA) Piper, ABOVE THE LAW, http://abovethelaw.com/2013/03/overbill 
ing-gone-wild-paying-the-dla-piper-plus-interesting-lateral-moves-into-and-out-of-dla/2/. 
For a story discussing the confidential settlement, see Peter Lattman, Settling Fee  
Dispute, Law Firm Denounces ‘E-Mail Humor,’ DEALBOOK, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2013,  
6:18 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/17/law-firm-dla-piper-settles-accusa 
tion-of-overbilling/. 
107  Or, more accurately, when lawyers at the firm are dumb enough to send such emails. 
108  For a cautionary tale of a firm that ignored several red flags of one of its highest billing 
partners, see MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET 
LAWYER (2004). See also Nancy B. Rapoport, The Curious Incident of the Law Firm That 
Did Nothing in the Night-Time, 10 LEGAL ETHICS 98 (2007) (reviewing MILTON C. REGAN, 
JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (2004)); Curtis & Resnik, 
supra note 93, at 1421. 
If the system of required hours makes it likely that associates will cheat, it is equally likely that 
firms will not monitor the associates closely because the firms stand to benefit from the hours 
logged. Incentives for firms to be above reproach in financial dealings with clients are under-
mined by the increasing difficulty for law firms to remain solvent while continuing to meet (or 
to set) market rates in paying partners and associates. 
Id. 
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IV. THE VIRTUOUS BILLER109 
Judge Schiltz has described the powerful impact his mentor, James 
Fitzmaurice, had on his own ethical and moral development as a law-
yer: 
Fitzmaurice did not teach me to practice law ethically 
through his words. I do not recall him ever saying, “This is what 
an ethical lawyer does.” Rather, he taught me through his deeds. 
He taught me by being a decent man who practiced law every day 
in a decent manner. Moral formation “rests on small matters, not 
great ones,” and what I recall most about Fitzmaurice are “the 
small matters”: 
I recall how Fitzmaurice would take strident letters or briefs 
that I had drafted and tone them down. I recall how Fitzmaurice 
would run into an attorney who had treated him shabbily and 
greet the attorney warmly. I recall how Fitzmaurice would time 
and again refer clients and files to young lawyers in our firm who 
were having trouble attracting business. I recall how Fitzmaurice 
never blamed others for his mistakes, but often gave others credit 
for his accomplishments. I recall how often Fitzmaurice took the 
blame for mistakes that I and other young attorneys made. I re-
call how Fitzmaurice, at the conclusion of a trial or hearing, 
would walk over to the client of his adversary and say, “I just 
want you to know that your attorney did a terrific job for you.” In 
short, what I best recall about Fitzmaurice were not occasions of 
great moral heroism, but his “quiet, everyday exhibitions of vir-
tue.” It was through such exhibitions that he helped shape my 
character and instill in me the habit of acting ethically.110 
Let’s assume that we want to describe the virtuous biller.111 What habits 
might he or she have that makes the lawyer a virtuous biller? Paul Saguil has 
set out his concept of the legal “virtues”: judgment, empathy, integrity/honesty, 
passion/engagement, diligence, and creativity/innovation.112 Those six catego-
ries seem to be a good place to start. 
                                                        
109  One way to think about billing virtues is by doing a jazz riff off Larry Solum’s article 
about judicial virtues. See Lawrence B. Solum, A Tournament of Virtue, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1365 (2005). 
110  McGinniss, supra note 75, at 55 (quoting Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The 
Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 
MINN. L. REV. 705, 738 (1998)). 
111  The virtuous biller “must both ‘walk the talk’ and ‘talk the walk’—making sure that be-
havior is consistent with other messages about ethics.” Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 
97, at 1170. 
112  Saguil, supra note 73, at 18–23. 
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A. Billing Judgment 
A virtuous biller exercises billing judgment by deciding what not to bill to 
the client—either before the work has been done or afterwards (but before the 
bill goes to the client).113 Deciding what not to bill before the work is done re-
quires thinking strategically about what the client needs, not just in the abstract 
but also with due consideration of the client’s budgetary and non-monetary 
concerns.114 Does the client need salaried (and thus more expensive) first-year 
associates to review documents, or can contract attorneys suit the client’s 
needs? Does the client need a typeset closing binder, or will a nicely bound 
word-processed binder do just as well? If a lawyer jumps down a rabbit hole115 
to pursue a legal theory that ultimately does nothing to advance the client’s po-
sition, should the billing partner bill all of that time to the client, part of it, or 
none of it?116 Should all interoffice conferences be billed, or just some of 
them?117 The virtuous biller uses judgment at two stages: when deciding what 
work to do, and when reviewing the bill after the work has been done. The lat-
ter stage is imperative, and the former stage will save the firm from wasted and 
uncompensated effort.118 
                                                        
113  To be more precise, the lawyer in charge of preparing a bill should be the one exercising 
billing judgment. Subordinate lawyers may not have the skill set or knowledge to exercise 
such judgment. In commenting on an earlier draft, our friend Ron Colombo suggested that 
we should advert to the possibility that a firm might encourage a lawyer to “underbill” for all 
sorts of reasons, in addition to creating incentives that might encourage overbilling. Cf. E-
mail from Ronald J. Colombo, Professor, Maurice A. Deane Sch. of Law, Hofstra Univ., to 
Nancy Rapoport (Aug. 28, 2014, 12:48 PM) (on file with author Rapoport). As Professor 
Colombo puts it, “virtue would seem to include not only avoiding the temptation to overbill, 
but the potential temptation to underbill as well.” Id. We get his point that we should discuss 
both overbilling and underbilling to make sure that we cover all of the bases. Maybe law 
firms do underbill, at least in part, when they cut their “rack rate” hourly rates; on the other 
hand, maybe the “rack rate” has achieved mythic proportions because most clients don’t pay 
that rate as often as they once did. (For a discussion of the downward pressures that clients 
are placing on law firm fees, see, e.g., Nancy B. Rapoport, The Case for Value Billing in 
Chapter 11, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 117, 142–48 (2012)). So we take his point, but we doubt 
that any client will ever complain about underbilling. Moreover, because neither of us be-
lieves that the billable hour represents a true value of the legal services rendered, we’re ad-
vocating for the billing judgment that recognizes that the “value” of legal services is in the 
eye of the client more than in the eye of the lawyer. 
114  It’s all well and good for a client to say, “it’s a matter of principle, no matter how much 
it costs,” but typically the client says that before he receives the bill. 
115  Cf. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 3 (two vols. in one,  1906). 
116  Maybe the lawyer should bill the client for all of the research, on the theory that knowing 
that an approach might not be fruitful is still useful information; we’re agnostic about that 
issue as long as the billing partner makes such a decision after thinking long and hard about 
whether billing for ultimately useless research was in the client’s best interest. 
117  See J. Scott Bovitz, Being a Great Lawyer (as a Partner), in NANCY B. RAPOPORT & 
JEFFREY D. VAN NIEL, LAW FIRM JOB SURVIVAL MANUAL: FROM FIRST INTERVIEW TO 
PARTNERSHIP 176–77 (2014) (encouraging the “no charge” notation on bills). 
118  See Fortney E-mail, supra note 89 (observing that virtuous lawyers will review bills with 
an eye toward benefitting the client and non-virtuous lawyers will review bills with an eye 
toward benefitting themselves). 
Spring 2015] VIRTUOUS BILLING 719 
B. Billing Empathy 
When we refer to “empathy,” we refer to a lawyer’s ability to see the bill 
from the client’s perspective.119 Different clients will have different levels of 
sophistication in reviewing their legal bills. Large institutional clients who have 
experienced in-house counsel (especially those who used to work at big law 
firms) will read a bill differently from the client who is encountering a legal bill 
for the first time. Empathy in billing is related to billing judgment in terms of 
what might get written off before the client gets the bill, but it also relates to the 
level of explanation that goes into the bill itself. 
Lawyers who have lived and breathed a case sometimes have a hard time 
looking at a legal bill as a way of telling the client the story of what they did for 
the client. “Review file” tells no story at all.120 “Review docket to determine 
status of motion to disqualify” does. A virtuous biller would read each line of a 
bill to make sure that the bill gives the client a complete and accurate picture of 
what happened. 
C. Billing Integrity/Honesty 
Even people who don’t use “virtue” in the Aristotelian sense will agree that 
billing virtue must include being honest about what the biller did for the client 
and being aware that all decisions about what to do—and not to do—on a mat-
ter should start with the principle that a lawyer is a fiduciary for her client. De-
cisions on what to do should start and end with the client’s needs, not the law-
yer’s needs. If the lawyer is low on hours for the month, quarter, or year, that’s 
the lawyer’s problem, not the client’s.121 
Part of billing integrity/honesty must include serious training in how and 
what to bill.122 The virtue of billing with honesty is a virtue for the supervising 
partner and for each billing professional.123 What may seem intuitive to a veter-
an lawyer (when and what to bill) can confuse the novice lawyer. New employ-
ees need to know the rules for hourly billing: when does the clock start and 
                                                        
119  Our colleague Jean Sternlight pointed out, in reviewing an earlier draft of this article, that 
unsophisticated clients might think that a reasonable bill is unreasonable, and that adjusting 
the bill in such a situation isn’t necessarily the right reaction (although explaining the bill 
would be important). 
120  Rapoport, supra note 6, at 86 (“ ‘[A]ttention to file’ has never told a single client what 
the biller actually did.”). 
121  See Lisa G. Lerman, Scenes From a Law Firm, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2153, 2158 (1998) 
(describing how a lawyer can create make-work projects and overbill for them). But see 
Fortney, supra note 96, at 280 (“Professor Ross contends that most over billing is the result 
of self-deception rather than conscious fraud.”). 
122  Supervising lawyers have a duty to ensure that their employees are behaving ethically. 
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (2011) (detailing the responsibilities of a part-
ner or supervisory lawyer). For a discussion of practical billing ethics, see, e.g., RAPOPORT & 
VAN NIEL, supra note 117, at 61–64. 
123  If we were smart alecks, we’d also refer to “excellent law firms” as if the firms were 
people. OK, we’re a little bit smart-alecky. 
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stop? What’s the minimum billing increment? What happens when the mini-
mum billing increment is still too large to use for a very short task, such as the 
gap between leaving a thirty-second message and a minimum 0.1-hour billing 
increment?124 Is thinking about the client while getting a cup of coffee billable 
time? If a lawyer spends an hour thinking about the right strategy for a matter, 
can the lawyer write “thinking” as the billing description?125 How can a firm 
reward time spent on non-billable activities?126 One of us has suggested that the 
easier it is for a timekeeper to enter information, the more likely it is that the 
timekeeper will do so contemporaneously.127 And we both believe that lawyers 
who join a firm—either as novices or as laterals—need to have training in that 
firm’s policies. 
But we acknowledge that every minute spent training new lawyers is a mi-
nute that can’t be spent doing other things that a firm needs its senior lawyers 
to do: work on their clients’ matters, generate new business, think about strate-
gic planning, and the like. Law firms these days are squeezed by clients—it’s a 
buyer’s market—and not particularly aided by law schools, which can’t provide 
the type of hands-on training to all of their students that those students taking 
clinics will get. Could law schools do a better job of giving students a broader 
range of skill sets, and maybe some billing training? Maybe, but many law pro-
fessors just don’t have an up-to-date connection to the practice of law to pro-
vide useful, practical, bread-and-butter training to their students.128 So we’re 
                                                        
124   Questions also relate to what could be called “phantom time.” Most firms do not have 
measures of actual time spent but bill in units of time, with rounding off (possibly rounding 
down but most often rounding up). In most large firms, the minimum unit ranges between six 
minutes (a tenth of an hour) to fifteen minutes (a quarter of an hour). If all tasks are charged, a 
one or two minute phone call, even if only to leave a message, could be billed as a quarter hour. 
An email sent or read similarly can produce bills of a tenth or a quarter of an hour. At the end of 
the day, a lawyer may have accumulated a wealth of hours and a list of charges, well in excess of 
the actual hours the lawyer spent in the office. 
Curtis & Resnik, supra note 93, at 1416–17. 
125  Personally, we think that an hour of time spent “thinking”—when done by someone who 
is demonstrably experienced and creative—isn’t a bad idea, but we still think that the de-
scription should be fleshed out. 
126  Fortney, supra note 97, at 179. 
Respondents frequently commented on employer emphasis on billable hours production 
and the pressure to clock long hours. In struggling to meet billing expectations or targets, re-
spondents explained the additional time commitment associated with completing non-billable 
tasks such as recruiting, training, speaking, writing, and marketing. Some noted that this non-
billable work does not receive credit or consideration for bonus purposes. 
Id.; see also Rapoport, supra note 6, at 98–102 (discussing possible incentives to encourage 
non-billable, but important, work). 
127  See Rapoport, supra note 6, at 85–86. 
128  Nor are most full-time faculty members allowed to have that type of current 
knowledge—at least not on a deep level. See ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE 
FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2013–2014 § 402(b) (2013) (“A full-time faculty member 
is one whose primary professional employment is with the law school and who devotes sub-
stantially all working time during the academic year to the responsibilities described in 
Standard 404(a), and whose outside professional activities, if any, are limited to those that 
relate to major academic interests or enrich the faculty member’s capacity as a scholar and 
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sympathetic to the pressures that law firms face as they decide how they’re go-
ing to train their timekeepers.129 
D. Billing Passion/Engagement 
If “engagement” refers to paying attention to what one is doing—to being 
fully in the moment—then the virtuous biller will monitor what’s going on in 
each matter, not just when reviewing the bill but also while the work is being 
done. She will monitor the matter to make adjustments to staffing and projects 
when circumstances change, and she will communicate to her client about those 
adjustments.130 
E. Billing Diligence 
A virtuous biller doesn’t wait until the end of the month131 to describe what 
he did for his clients.132 Waiting too long to record time is bad for the lawyer 
(he may forget to record some time)133 and bad for the client (if the lawyer 
overestimates the time that he spent on a task). Instead, the virtuous lawyer cre-
ates habits that force him to record his time contemporaneously. When those 
                                                                                                                                
teacher, are of service to the legal profession and the public generally, and do not unduly in-
terfere with one’s responsibility as a faculty member.”). 
129  As Bernie Burk put it in an email to one of us: 
The choice is not between bearing and avoiding a cost (training); it’s between bearing training 
costs and bearing the larger, more pervasive and more damaging (if harder to quantify and iden-
tify, and thus subject to cognitive bias) costs of having untrained lawyers. [T]he fact that the cur-
rent state of the economics of the profession means that partners have to choose between a 
smaller cost and a bigger cost sucks for them, but that’s the reality and when in doubt it’s better 
to face reality than ignore it. 
E-mail from Bernard A. Burk, Professor, U.N.C. Sch. of Law, to Nancy Rapoport (July 6, 
2014) (on file with author Rapoport). 
130  And, when appropriate, she will seek her client’s permission before making those ad-
justments. 
131  Or even until the end of the day. 
132  Submitting late timesheets created two serious problems: first, without a record of billable 
hours, billing partners couldn’t send timely and complete bills to their clients; second, without 
making a contemporaneous record of what a lawyer had spent his or her time doing, developing 
those detailed records was an ethically risky proposition. There may have been some lawyers 
who could think back several weeks and belatedly record their work down to small slices of an 
hour, but they would have needed a superhuman memory to have done so accurately. Either they 
underestimated their work, or they overestimated it. The pressure to bill at least 1,800 (or 2,200, 
or 2,600, or more) hours a year likely meant that the scale of “filling in the blanks” created at 
least a subconscious incentive to overestimate the time spent on a given task. 
Rapoport, supra note 6, at 51–52 (footnotes omitted). 
133  In other words, the lawyer makes a misrepresentation by making up entries to reflect 
what he “recalled.” That misrepresentation is bad, and in certain circumstances (involving 
reasonable reliance), such misrepresentation can rise (or sink, as the case may be) to outright 
fraud, of both the civil and criminal variety. 
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habits are combined with the correct incentives for contemporaneous descrip-
tions of his work, the odds of the bill’s accuracy go up dramatically.134 
F. Billing Creativity 
We won’t go so far as to say that a virtuous biller will eschew all billing by 
the hour,135 but we will say that a virtuous biller will consider alternative forms 
of determining how to set her fees. Contingency fees are an example;136 flat 
fees are another;137 success fees are yet another.138 The trick in setting a reason-
able fee139 is that it should reflect the relationship between work done and value 
provided, keeping in mind risk factors that include the client losing, the client 
becoming insolvent, and the other side refusing to pay, as well as the amount of 
time devoted to the matter (on the theory that—for most lawyers—there are on-
ly twenty-four hours in a day, and work done for one client precludes other us-
es of that time). 
One other issue of billing creativity deserves mention here. Law firms 
should train their associates.140 Training is not cost-free, and clients have start-
ed to push back hard on the idea that they should pay for the training.141 That 
pushback leaves law firms with two choices: absorb training costs, or stop 
training associates. The virtuous biller will write off training time, in the belief 
that investing in associate training will pay off in the long term.142 
                                                        
134  Susan Fortney has pointed out two other advantages: “The ethical lawyer who recon-
structs time will shortchange him[-] or her[ ]self. Also contemporaneous billing enables a 
lawyer to testify that she always records as she goes along.” Fortney E-mail, supra note 89. 
135  After all, each of us bills at least a part of our time that way. 
136  But contingency fees can also sometimes lead to unethical settlements that can benefit 
the lawyer more than the client. 
137  Flat fees, though, can create an incentive to stop working once the case is no longer prof-
itable for the lawyer—which is, of course, unethical. 
138  And success fees can create an incentive to craft solutions that will trigger those fees. 
139  Fees must be reasonable. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (“A lawyer 
shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable 
amount for expenses.”). 
140  We both believe that law schools don’t provide sufficient “real-world” training for their 
students to be able to hit the ground running as soon as they get their law licenses. 
141  See, e.g., Fortney, supra note 97, at 189 (“Faced with intense pressure to reduce amounts 
expended for outside counsel, many of these approaches involved cost-cutting measures, 
such as using independent legal auditors, task-based billing, and research outsourcing. . . . 
Surveys of general counsel reveal that their most pressing concern is controlling the costs of 
outside counsel.”); see also Rapoport, supra note 6, at 99 & n.192 (“[L]aw firms now neither 
provide significant observation experience nor write off as much time as they used to; more-
over, those clients with good bargaining power are starting to refuse to pay for first- and sec-
ond-year associate time.”); cf. Rapoport, supra note 113, at 145–46 (“The days of clients 
blithely acquiescing to skyrocketing hourly rates and burgeoning staffing of projects (if, in-
deed, those days ever existed) are gone.”). 
142  That investment pays off well when the associate stays at the firm and becomes a good 
lawyer; it pays off less well when the associate leaves. 
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G. Billing Virtues Versus Billing Vices 
Now that we have some basic descriptions of the billing virtues, it’s useful 
to compare the virtues to their opposites, the billing vices. 
TABLE 1: BILLING VIRTUES AND CORRESPONDING VICES 
Billing virtue Billing vice 
Billing judgment Billing everything to the client, even wasteful work or 
make-work 
Billing empathy Not describing work done for the client at all, or not 
describing it in a way that the client will understand 
what the lawyer did 
Billing integrity/honesty Putting the lawyer’s own needs (to make a billable 
hour quota or to jockey for position within a firm) 
above the client’s needs; misrepresenting work that’s 
been done 
Billing passion/engagement Not paying attention to what’s being done on a matter, 
and not scrutinizing the bill before sending it to the 
client 
Billing diligence Not recording time contemporaneously 
Billing creativity Adhering rigorously to the billable hours model, with-
out instruction in how to bill time and without absorb-
ing the costs of training associates 
With these virtues—and vices—in mind, let’s apply the virtues to create better 
billers. 
V. VIRTUOUS BILLING APPLIED 
A. Creating a System to Find—and Recognize—Red Flags 
Ethical law firms want to build ethical habits. They do not want their law-
yers billing phantom hours. One structural change that these law firms can in-
stitute is to have its bills (or, at least, its larger bills) subject to routine audit. 
Indeed, that is what some firms are doing. The auditors work for the law firm, 
not the client, so they can report the problem and give the firm an opportunity 
to correct it. 
A law firm that institutes this change sends a message to every partner and 
associate: it is better for the law firm to catch the error (whether or not inten-
tional) than for the law firm to react to a client’s complaint. And it is better for 
the lawyer not to pad his hours because it will not look good if the law firm’s 
auditors discover the padding.143 
Although the truly virtuous biller will have developed those habits that re-
sult in accurate, ethical, understandable bills, we must assume that there will be 
                                                        
143  Rotunda, supra note 1, at 720 (footnotes omitted). 
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those who have not yet developed such habits and those who are the classical 
bad actors.144 The virtuous law firm will, as President Reagan once said, 
“[t]rust, but verify.”145 The many scandals that have occurred in organizations 
ranging from Enron146 to General Motors147 happened in part because the or-
ganizations’ internal systems didn’t check the right things and didn’t pay atten-
tion to red flags. Law firms haven’t escaped such scandals,148 and they need to 
make sure that neither willful blindness to misconduct nor subconscious cogni-
tive errors will keep them from discovering problems in billing behavior.149 
B. Training the Billers 
We’ve already discussed the importance of training people on how and 
what to bill.150 Law firms probably understand how important training on bill-
ing is for every new employee, but understanding the need and providing effec-
tive training are two different things. As Susan Saab Fortney has explained, 
Neophyte attorneys forge into private practice with little or no experience in 
billing their time. Often associates start work with a “lecture” from a senior at-
torney who advises associates to “[b]ill every minute . . . we’ll adjust the bill on 
the back end.” This approach to billing does not recognize the traps involved in 
                                                        
144  And we don’t mean “bad actors” as in those actors that you see in straight-to-video 
flicks. 
145  The Conservative Will, Trust But Verify, YOUTUBE (MAR. 7, 2008), https://www.youtube 
.com/watch?v=As6y5eI01XE. Finding ways to verify can be fun (and amusing). In a recent 
article, Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner explained why David Lee Roth’s performance 
contract insisted that his dressing room have no brown M&Ms. People who read the contract 
carefully enough to realize that brown M&Ms were verboten and who were willing to sift 
through the M&Ms to pull out the brown ones would do a good job on the more important 
parts of his pre-concert set-up. Steven D. Levitt & Stephen J. Dubner, Traponomics, WALL 
ST. J., May 10, 2014, at C1. Thanks to Levitt and Dubner, now fledgling law review staffers 
will know why their Bluebooking and proofreading skills matter so much. 
146  See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Van Niel & Nancy B. Rapoport, Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Skilling: How En-
ron’s Public Image Morphed from the Most Innovative Company in the Fortune 500 to the 
Most Notorious Company Ever, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 77 
(Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004). 
147  See ANTON R. VALUKAS, REPORT TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GENERAL MOTORS 
COMPANY REGARDING IGNITION SWITCH RECALLS (2014), available at 
http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20140605/SPECIAL01/140605001. 
148  See, e.g., Lerman, supra note 98, at 848 (2006) (discussing the billing scandal central to 
the case of In re Romansky); see also Lattman, supra note 106; Pardau, supra note 91, at 6–
7 (2013) (providing a laundry list of billing scandals at both big and small law firms). 
149  [C]onsider a firm that awards bonuses based on billable hours. If Associate B bills an average of 
165 hours per month through September, but then bills 250 hours per month in the three remain-
ing months of the year, thus reaching 2,235 hours and earning the $30,000 bonus the firm 
awards for 2,200 hours, are there reasonable grounds for suspicion? Perhaps B became involved 
in a large matter requiring an exceptional time commitment late in the year, or saw a dramatical-
ly increased workload for other legitimate reasons. It is also possible that B falsified time to earn 
a bonus to which B was not entitled. Either way, an alert firm leader tracking billable hours can 
determine whether there is cause for concern. 
Richmond, supra note 2, at 111 (footnote omitted). 
150  See supra notes 122–25. 
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billing another attorney’s time. First, it assumes that the supervisor possesses 
enough information on the client’s legal matter to evaluate intelligently the 
amount of time expended. Second, the approach assumes that the supervisor can 
ably sift through associate time sheets, which may be “propaganda piece[s].” Fi-
nally, if the firm compensates a billing partner for the amount collected from 
billed clients, the billing partner may be reluctant to write off associate time. 
Some senior attorneys may provide additional guidance on billing in in-
structing associates to “write down your time the same day, be honest, use good 
judgment, and don’t double bill.” This general advice gives associates unfettered 
discretion because the rules on billing practices remain unclear. Even when firm 
managers implement general billing guidelines, attorneys still have a great deal 
of latitude in the way that they apply the guidelines. This was illustrated by a 
management consultant who found a great deal of disparity in what firm partners 
would bill for travel, even though the firm implemented a policy to bill for travel 
time. Rather than leaving attorneys in a quandary on billing practices, firm man-
agers can clarify how and what attorneys should bill. This guidance can include 
written guidelines, training programs and formalized channels within the firm 
for open communication.151 
Training programs are necessary but by no means sufficient. The effect of so-
cial pressure (how other billers behave in the same firm) can counteract any of-
ficial training program over time.152 Not only is it important that the people at 
the top of the pecking order set the right tone,153 but it is equally important that 
                                                        
151  Fortney, supra note 96, at 252–53 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted). 
152  See Rapoport, supra note 6, at 63–66 & nn.72–82 (describing Solomon Asch’s experi-
ments in social pressure and applying social pressure concepts to life inside a law firm). 
153   Another unintended consequence of quantifying law practice is that ethical attorneys who 
do not pad or do not work long hours may be placed at a competitive disadvantage come evalua-
tion time. A couple of respondents referred to this problem. One respondent who described his 
or her diligence in using an electronic timer program to bill by the minute, expressed frustration 
over colleagues who estimate their time. The respondent stated, “I can’t compete with estima-
tors, but I’m not willing to compromise my strict billing practice either.” In noting that the billa-
ble hours system “encourages lying,” another respondent explained, “If you don’t lie, you are 
perceived to be a slacker, even though, in reality, you may work far more than others.” “Slacker” 
associates may feel pressure to change their practices or find other employment. Ethical associ-
ates who refuse to compromise their standards may become increasingly disillusioned in having 
to compete with other associates who use questionable billing practices to record hours. These 
ethical associates may voluntarily leave private practice. 
Fortney, supra note 96, at 279; see also id. at 247–48 (“Even when firms deny the existence 
of a minimum or quota, associates learn about the firm’s expectations or norms.”). For an-
other view of minimum requirements, cf. OFFICE SPACE (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 
1999), with quotes available at http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0151804/quotes: 
Stan, Chotchkie’s Manager: We need to talk about your flair. 
Joanna: Really? I . . . I have fifteen pieces on. I, also . . . 
Stan, Chotchkie’s Manager: Well, okay. Fifteen is the minimum, okay? 
Joanna: Okay. 
Stan, Chotchkie’s Manager: Now, you know it’s up to you whether or not you want to just do 
the bare minimum. Or . . . well, like Brian, for example, has thirty[-]seven pieces of flair, 
okay. And a terrific smile. 
Joanna: Okay. So you . . . you want me to wear more? 
Stan, Chotchkie’s Manager: Look. Joanna. 
Joanna: Yeah. 
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a biller’s peers behave appropriately. Solomon Asch’s work teaches us that 
having as few as one or two people in a group diverge can cause others to go 
astray, even when they “know better.”154 
What kind of training would a virtuous law firm provide to its new em-
ployees? Dennis Curtis and Judith Resnik have some good ideas: 
[T]he seeming simplicity of an hourly billing system hides a series of ques-
tions—about which hours to bill, about the uses of billable hours, and about law 
firm structure and incentives. What is “work” that ought to be billed? Who judg-
es how much of that work is necessary? 
Start first with deciding what counts as “work” for which time can be 
billed. Easy agreement emerges around the idea that lawyers can properly 
charge for legal work—research; writing memoranda for the purpose of giving 
advice; representing clients at negotiations, in court, and in administrative pro-
ceedings; lobbying or working on legislation and regulations; and perhaps in co-
ordinating public relations or developing information from other professions 
about projects related to a client’s interests. In terms of the quantity of such 
work, agreement between client and lawyer may in fact be more difficult to 
achieve, as clients may worry about lawyers who do more than is needed for a 
particular project. 
Assume for the moment that a packet of activity constitutes “the work” 
properly done by lawyers, as contrasted with para-professionals or nonprofes-
sionals. How much of it needs to be done? What work is actually necessary? 
And who decides? Entailed are questions of delegation—about which workers 
ought to undertake which tasks and about which workers determine the contours 
of the task. Most of those who have explored these issues agree that the problem 
of measuring the quantity of such work that ought to be undertaken is signifi-
cant. A widely shared perception is that the billable hour affects the lawyer’s an-
swer to that question. As William Ross explains, 
[o]ne of the most egregious forms of overbilling in many law firms is the 
almost infinite amount of time that is expended upon research into even 
the most minute legal issues. As with other forms of overbilling, exces-
sive research probably arises most often out of a genuine belief that the 
work serves the client’s best interests, even if that belief is part of a sub-
conscious rationalization of the desire to inflate the client’s bill.155 
                                                                                                                                
Stan, Chotchkie’s Manager: People can get a cheeseburger anywhere, okay? They come to 
Chotchkie’s for the atmosphere and the attitude. Okay? That’s what the flair’s about. It’s 
about fun. 
Joanna: Yeah. Okay. So more[,] then, yeah? 
Stan, Chotchkie’s Manager: Look, we want you to express yourself, okay? Now if you feel that 
the bare minimum is enough, then okay. But some people choose to wear more and we en-
courage that, okay? You do want to express yourself, don’t you? 
Joanna: Yeah, yeah. 
Stan, Chotchkie’s Manager: Okay. Great. Great. That’s all I ask. 
154  Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, 193 SCI. AM. 31, 31–34 (1955); see 
also Rapoport, supra note 6, at 62–64 (discussing Asch’s experiments). 
155  Curtis & Resnik, supra note 93, at 1413–14 (footnotes omitted); see also Lerman, supra 
note 98, at 888–89 (discussing how much lawyer discretion is involved in billing time). One 
of us has suggested the use of (or the development of) computer software that would help 
lawyers record their time contemporaneously. See Rapoport, supra note 6, at 85–87. Jennifer 
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One possible source of training that might combine client development 
with the development of useful habits is for a firm to invite inside counsel to 
the firm, on a regular basis, to engage in a conversation about things that inside 
counsel wish that their outside counsel would do differently.156 A firm could 
bring in a panel of judges who rule regularly on issues like fee requests to talk 
about what does and doesn’t pass muster. And a firm could bring in its insur-
ance carrier to talk about common pitfalls. We know that good training is hard, 
and it’s expensive, but the failure to train may end up costing a firm more in the 
long run. 
C. The Tyranny of the 0.1 Hour Increment 
As an aside, we can’t resist pointing out that the decision on what the 
smallest billable increment in a firm should be creates some powerful 
(dis)incentives. The larger the minimum increment, the more likely it is that 
billers under pressure will fit tiny tasks into a vessel meant for bigger tasks. A 
thirty-second phone call shouldn’t be billed as a quarter-hour (or tenth of an 
hour) of work, but that doesn’t mean that someone won’t try to do just that. On 
the other hand, the smaller the increment, the less meaningful it becomes when 
someone is exercising the virtue of billing diligence. If a lawyer bills in tenths 
of an hour and engages in multiple tasks each hour, is she really going to be 
willing to spend more than a tenth of an hour to record her time in those tenths, 
or will she just estimate, cross her fingers, and hope for a reasonably ethical re-
sult? It’s difficult to maintain billing diligence on the busiest of days. 
That’s why training—and a more useful billing policy—is so important. 
Here’s one option: 
Imagine, for example, a firm decision that no one could bill any client for 
less than ten minutes of time and that if amounts smaller than that were spent, no 
billable time would be logged. Imagine a rule that, as each lawyer departed for 
the day, that person had to leave a time sheet, and that no information logged 
later could be entered for that time period. Imagine that firms developed a sys-
tem of team billing. The group of lawyers responsible for a given case might 
have projected caps on billing and no member of the group could enter hours 
without a more senior person agreeing that the time spent was necessary. Imag-
ine a presumption against spending more than a certain number of hours a 
month, with a view that anyone logging over a specific amount had to meet with 
two senior members of the firm to explain the reality and propriety of excess 
hours. (Instead of minimum billable hours, imagine law practice with the conceit 
of maximum billable hours.) The practices of billing could shift from an indi-
vidualistic activity to a cooperative event, with lawyers working on the same 
matter deciding together at the end of the day or week how many hours to bill. 
                                                                                                                                
Robbennolt and Jean Sternlight have pointed out that people tend to want to search for more 
and more information when making decisions. See JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. 
STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS 85 (2012). 
156  Or a law firm could invite the two of us to such a conversation, but we can’t throw much 
business to the firm, and inside counsel can. 
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Further, junior lawyers could be told that they lack the authority to determine the 
amount of time to record, and rather that the responsibility for allocating work 
and counting hours rested with the partners in charge. Such changes would re-
quire firms to work hard to allocate jobs among lawyers, but the benefit would 
be that the lawyers could concentrate on the substantive projects without worry-
ing about whether the hours spent added sufficiently to their monthly total.157 
Not only would a system like this one be more ethical, but it would also be 
more humane and more efficient.158 
CONCLUSION 
The moral fabric of an attorney is stitched out in the dozens—
hundreds—of decisions that she makes each day. It is stitched out in the 
tone of voice she uses when talking with others, out of her choice of ad-
jectives while writing a letter, out of the care she takes in describing 
what she represents to be the truth of a matter. It is stitched out of one 
decision after another, each of which may be mundane in itself, but all of 
which combine to form the moral fabric of the attorney, and combine 
with like decisions of other attorneys to form the moral fabric of law 
firms and legal communities. 
Not only are these decisions mundane, they are made almost instinc-
tively. “Discernment is hard work; it takes time and emotional energy.” 
Busy lawyers have neither. When an attorney is asked a question by a 
client or judge or when she sifts through documents that have been de-
manded by her opponent, or when she fills out her time sheet before 
rushing out of the office, she will have fractions of seconds to make deci-
sions. She will have little time to think, much less to seek the counsel of 
colleagues or texts. She will act almost instinctively. What she does will 
not reflect the quality of her mind as much as it will reflect the quality of 
her character; it will not reflect discernment as much as it will reflect 
habit.159 
Developing the habits that create virtuous billers will create a chicken-and-
egg problem, but that’s not a bad thing. As our colleague Tigran Eldred has 
pointed out, 
if a law firm develops the types of virtuous billing practices you describe, would 
any improved ethical behavior be the result of more virtuous lawyers? Or would 
it be because the institutional incentives and norms create the type of influence 
                                                        
157  Curtis & Resnik, supra note 93, at 1423–24. 
158  See also Alexandra Wolfe, David Boies—The Lawyer on Overturning Proposition 8 and 
the Secret to His Legal Successes, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2014, at C1 (describing David 
Boies’s shift away from billing by the hour to fixed fees, on the grounds that hourly billing 
creates bad incentives and makes the workplace “less collegial”). 
159  McGinniss, supra note 75, at 49 (quoting Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The 
Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 
MINN. L. REV. 705, 719–20 (1998)). 
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toward conformity that you and others have so well documented in organiza-
tional settings?160 
We don’t know whether developing better habits will make people more virtu-
ous only in the Aristotelian sense, or whether developing better habits will 
make people truly more ethical.161 But we think that the effort is worthwhile. 
One caveat, though: we wish that we could end on a wholly positive note, 
but we think that the classical lawyer virtues will continue to exceed our grasp 
so long as the problems that we’ve identified with multinational corporate law 
practices persist. Mind you, we’re not suggesting that lawyers in multinational 
firms can’t serve clients with technical excellence (they can, and they do) or 
that lawyers cannot behave ethically and morally (most do). And we know that 
some lawyers have found (or will find) ways to practice in a classically virtu-
ous way. For as Bill Henderson has suggested, law firms outside the primary 
capital markets may well abandon the Cravath system and find ways to build 
solid (perhaps not solid gold) practices around like-minded lawyers, no longer 
in thrall to rainmakers and their omnipresent threats of departure. We have our 
doubts, because it takes a great deal of traction to pull away from institutions 
weighed down by money and tradition, but we’re still hopeful. 
 
                                                        
160  E-mail from Tigran Eldred, Professor, New England Law | Boston, to Nancy Rapoport 
(July 9, 2014) (on file with author Rapoport). 
161  And at least one of us doesn’t care. When she teaches Professional Responsibility, she 
tells her students that she cares more about whether they behave as if they’re ethical than if 
they actually are ethical. She believes that she can teach people how to behave as if they’re 
ethical. See supra note 7; cf. supra note 41. 
